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THE COSTS OF HARMONIZATION:
THE EMBRACE OF AN INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT
REGIME IN GOLAN V. HOLDER
Angelie Thomas*
INTRODUCTION
A copyright creates exclusive rights to a literary and artistic
work that is original.1 Copyrights are territorial by nature:2 there is
no grant of copyright protection that extends worldwide. 3
Nevertheless, an international copyright regime has developed,
consisting of bilateral copyright treaties and multilateral copyright
conventions that now protect the expression of ideas far beyond
their country of origin.4
The first accord to shape the foundation of this
international copyright regime was the 1886 Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (“Berne
Convention”). 5 Under the Berne Convention, nationals of a
member country enjoy copyright protection beyond their nation’s

* J.D. Candidate, St. John’s University School of Law, Class of 2014.
1
See PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT:
PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE 4 (2d ed. 2010). These exclusive rights
generally include the right to reproduce, distribute, publicly perform, broadcast,
and otherwise communicate a work to the public, id.
2
Id. at 97. Under the territoriality principle, copyright exists under the laws of
individual countries and ends at their borders. This principle addresses two
interests: national sovereignty and the promotion of international commerce by
securing reasonable investment expectations, id. at 95.
3
See Jon Baumgarten, Primer on the Principles of International Copyright, in
FOURTH ANNUAL U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE SPEAKS: CONTEMPORARY
COPYRIGHT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES 470, 471 (1992) (arguing that
the term “international copyright” is a misnomer because there is no existing
single code governing copyright protection across national borders).
4
See Jane C. Ginsburg, Ownership of Electronic Rights and the Private Int’l
Law of Copyright, 22 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 165, 169 (1998) (describing the
international copyright regime as a collection of copyrights by virtue of bilateral
and multilateral treaties); see also Lynn Carino, Note, Creative Technology, Ltd.
v. Aztech System Pte, Ltd.: The Ninth Circuit Sends a United States Copyright
Infringement Case to Singapore on a Motion of Forum Non Conveniens, 41
VILL. L. REV. 325, 330 (1996).
5
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
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borders.6 Article 18 of the Berne Convention requires countries to
protect the works of other member States unless the works’
copyright term has expired in the country where protection was
claimed or the country of origin.7 The United States only joined
the Convention in 1989, having formerly resisted the forces of
international harmonization.8 Even after joining Berne, Congress
adopted a minimalist approach to the copyright regime, making
only those changes to American copyright law that were explicitly
required under the treaty’s provisions.9 It offered no protection to
any foreign work that was in the public domain in the United
States. Thus, while the United States declared its compliance with
Berne, it never addressed or enacted legislation to implement
Article 18 of the Convention.10
6

See id. at art. 1 (providing that the countries to which the Berne Convention
applies “constitute a Union for the protection of the rights of authors in their
literary and artistic works”); see also id. at art. 3 (stating that the protection of
the Convention applies to “(a) authors who are nationals of one of the countries
of the Union, for their works, whether published or not” and “(b) authors who
are not nationals of one of the countries of the Union, for their works first
published in one of those countries, or simultaneously in a country outside the
Union and in a country of the Union”).
7
See id. at art. 18. Article 18 establishes that the Berne Convention applies to
“works which at the moment of its coming into force, ha[d] not yet fallen into
the public domain in the country of origin through the expiry of the term of
protection,” id. Article 18 states further that “if… through the expiry of the term
of protection which was previously granted, a work has fallen into the public
domain of the country where protection is claimed,” the work will not be
protected, id.
8
See PAUL E. GELLER, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE § 5
(2012); see also Edward L. Carter, Harmonization of Copyright Law In
Response To Technological Change: Lessons From Europe About Fair Use And
Free Expression, 30 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 312, 316 (2009).
9
See H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 52 (1988); see also Carter, supra note 8, at 316
(noting that under the Berne Convention the United States was required to
recognize the moral rights of authors, but that the U.S. Congress skirted this
requirement by only recognizing moral rights in a very limited way for certain
visual artists).
10
See S. REP. NO. 103-412 at 225 (1994). The Berne Convention was generally
viewed as being non-self-executing. It thus required domestic legislation to
implement the treaty in the United States. By passing the 1988 Berne
implementation amendments, Congress left no doubt of its view that the Berne
Convention was not self-executing: the amendments provide that “any country
party to this convention undertakes to adopt, in accordance with its constitution,
the measures necessary to ensure the application of this Convention,” see PAUL
GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE 15
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In 1994, however, the backdrop changed. The Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(“TRIPS”) mandated an implementation of the first twenty-one
articles of the Berne Convention. 11 TRIPS enforced
the harmonization effort by tying intellectual property protection to
trade: nations that failed to comply with TRIPS would be subject
to international trade sanctions. 12 In response to the TRIPS
requirement, Congress enacted § 514 of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act (URAA), belatedly granting certain foreign works
in the public domain the copyright protection that they would have
enjoyed if the United States had fully complied with its obligations
under the Berne Convention in 1989.13
Recently, in Golan v. Holder,14 the Supreme Court of the
United States reviewed the constitutionality of the URAA § 514
enactment. Petitioners were orchestra conductors, musicians, and
publishers who formerly had free access to works that § 514
removed from the public domain. 15 They argued that the
retroactive copyright restorations of the URAA violated the
Constitution, exceeding Congressional authority under the
Copyright Clause and transgressing First Amendment limitations.16
The Court, however, disagreed with the plaintiffs, and held
that § 514 of the URAA neither contravened constitutional
limitations placed on Congress nor deviated from First
Amendment principles. 17 It found that because § 514 merely
& n.19 (1st ed. 2001) (describing self-executing and non-self-executing treaties
in the context of the Berne Convention).
11
See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art.
9, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) (stating that “members shall comply with
Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention”).
12
See Carter, supra note 8, at 315.
13
See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, sec. 514, § 104A,
108 Stat. 4809, 4976-81 (1994) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 104A, 109(a) (2011)).
14
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 873 (2012).
15
Id. at 878. Prior to the URAA enactment, each petitioner utilized or performed
works by foreign artists in the public domain. Lawrence Golan in particular
performed and taught works by foreign composers including Dmitri
Shostakovich and Igor Stravinsky, see id. Following the enactment, petitioners
were either prevented from using these works or were required to pay higher
licensing fees that were often cost-prohibitive. See Golan v. Gonzalez, 501 F.3d
1179, 1182 (10th Cir. Colo. 2007).
16
See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 883.
17
Id. at 878.
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continued the trend toward a harmonized copyright regime,18 and
there was no reason to reject Congress’s rational judgment that
adherence to the Berne Convention would serve the objectives of
the Copyright Clause. 19 Congress had determined that U.S.
interests were best served by full participation in the dominant
system of international copyright protection. 20 The Court
maintained that its obligation was not to determine whether this
decision was wise, but whether it was constitutional.21
Though the Court was correct in limiting its decision to a
constitutional analysis, Golan nevertheless affirms a harmonization
of copyright that the United States had previously rejected for two
centuries. The Court adopted a deferential approach to copyright
legislation, such that challenges to the constitutionality of future
expansions to copyright protection are unlikely to succeed.22 This
comment will argue that the Court failed to consider the costs of
moving toward an international copyright regime. Part A will
discuss how such a regime can impoverish developing nations in
their effort to comply with international copyright requirements
that poorly support their local conditions. Part B will show how
the international right to free expression can be abridged by a
harmonized copyright system.
Part C will suggest that
diversification of copyright law may provide the better alternative.
I. The Costs of Harmonization to Developing Countries
The danger of creating a harmonized international
copyright regime stems from the inherent distinctions between
18

Id. The Court explained that by fully implementing the Berne Convention,
Congress ensured that both foreign and domestic works would be governed by
the same legal regime, id. at 893 (noting that before the United States joined
Berne, domestic works were protected under U.S. statutes and bilateral
international agreements, while many foreign works were available royalty-free
at an artificially low cost).
19
Id. (finding that the decision to implement URAA § 514 was well within the
power of the political branches).
20
Id. These interests included ensuring compliance with international
obligations, securing greater protection for U.S. authors abroad, and remedying
unequal treatment of foreign authors, id. at 894.
21
Id. (declaring that it was the Court’s duty to determine whether the action
Congress took exceeded any constitutional limitations).
22
See Mary LaFrance, Emerging Issues, Supreme Court's Decision to Uphold
the Constitutionality of Copyright Restoration: Golan v. Holder, 2012 U.S.
LEXIS 907, 2012 EMERGING ISSUES 6197 (Jan. 31, 2012).
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developed nations and developing nations. The original Western
intellectual property system became universal because of the
economic and military support backing it, not because it embodied
universal values.23 Thus, a “one size fits all” copyright regime
with a global application may not be appropriate.24
The uniformity of copyright legislation in developing
countries is evidenced by their use of text copied exactly from the
treaty language of the Berne Convention, without the slight
deviation seen in the copyright laws of most developed nations.
This suggests that these laws were created without attention to the
distinct cultural interests, informational constraints, and economic
realities of each country.25 An international copyright system that
disregards these significant differences severely disadvantages
developing nations and has various consequences in each country.
Developing nations face cultural and educational barriers after the
adoption of such programs. Furthermore, there are significant
administrative costs involved in implementing the universal
system.
A. The Inhibition of Cultural Progress
A nation’s system of copyright embodies its priorities in
establishing a unique cultural environment.26 These priorities vary
widely among countries with different social traditions. 27 The
23

See Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property at a Crossroads: The Use of the Past in
Intellectual Property Jurisprudence: Currents and Crosscurrents in the
International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 391
(2004).
24
See id.
25
See Ruth L. Okediji, The International Copyright System: Limitations,
Exceptions and Public Interest Considerations for Developing Countries,
UNCTAD - ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development 30 (2006),
http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/Okediji%20%20Copyright%20and%2
0DC%20-%20Blue%2015.pdf (“[T]he uniformity of the limitations and
exceptions evident in the legislation of many developing countries suggests that
most of these laws were modeled on the Berne Convention without
particularized attention to unique social interests, institutional constraints and/or
political realities of each country.”).
26
See Matt Jackson, Harmony Or Discord? The Pressure Toward Conformity In
International Copyright, 43 IDEA 607, 640 (2003) (explaining how copyright
law is an instrument of cultural and information policy).
27
There are some nations, such as France and Germany, that place a heavier
emphasis on the "moral rights" of authors, see Jackson, supra note 26, at 640.
Other nations, like the United States, concentrate on the utilitarian objective of
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priorities of developed nations are often centered around free
market principles, individual rights, and the concept that profits are
the appropriate reward for the labor applied to creative
endeavors. 28 Such beliefs result in laws that provide strong
copyright protection. By contrast, nations built on foundations of
Confucianism, Buddhism, and Islam are more communally
oriented. 29 These beliefs indicate that knowledge and wealth
should be shared within society and distributed equally, 30
suggesting the creation of copyright laws with limitations and
exceptions for the public interest. By mandating the adoption of a
universal system representing solely the priorities of developed
nations, less-developed countries are deprived of the ability to
tailor their copyright system to local beliefs.31
Countries with growing entertainment industries often
stand to suffer most from an ill-fitting international copyright
system. Senegal, for example, seeks to develop a music industry to
diversify its economic base and strengthen the cultural solidarity of
the country, looking to the city of Nashville for inspiration. 32
Lebanon has an entertainment industry ready to explode onto the
international arena.33 In such countries, certain genres of works
and modes of expression purposely incorporate, reproduce, or
transform pre-existing works.34 Facilitating access to protected
works becomes vital to promoting ongoing creative activity,
progress and growth.35 A harmonized copyright regime blocks
promoting the production of creative works, id. (asserting that these differences
contribute to a richer diversity of cultural products).
28
See id. at 641 (citing Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and
Incorporation of International Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62
OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 740 (2001)).
29
See id. at 641–42 (citing Richard E. Vaughan, Defining Terms in Intellectual
Property Protection Debate: Are the North and South Arguing Past Each Other
When They Say “Property”? A Lockean, Confucian, and Islamic Comparison, 2
ILSA J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 307, 321 (1996).
30
See id. at 641.
31
See Peter K. Yu, International Lawmaking In The New Millennium: An
Introduction, 10 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 3 (2002).
32
See Lauren Loew, Note, Creative Industries in Developing Countries and
Intellectual Property Protection, 9 VAND. J ENT. & TECH L. 171, 173 (2006).
33
See id.
34
See Okediji, supra note 25, at x. Modern examples include the practice of
“sampling” in the music industry, narrative styles in literature and creative
writing, and programming software for interoperability, id.
35
See id. at x–xi.
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access to these works and thus inhibits cultural progress that free
access would otherwise encourage.
B. A Barrier to Information and Educational Access
The harmonization of copyright law can result in the loss of
national autonomy, as it not only prevents nations from pursuing
their own domestic cultural agendas,36 but also sacrifices diverse
perspectives on the role of information in society. 37 This is
particularly the case in developing countries’ access to educational
materials.
The materials most often affected by copyright in these
countries are textbooks, journals, course packs and information
that can be found in libraries.38 Copyright holders control the
photocopying, reprinting, distributing of such materials.39 They
also have the right to prohibit parallel importation of educational
materials from cheaper sources.40 For example, foreign publishers
supplying the book market in Thailand prohibit parallel
importation of cheaper books from China or India.41 Books in
Thailand also cannot be exported to other nations.42 In South
Africa, medical personnel who wish to distribute copyrighted
material about HIV/ AIDS to students and patients are required to
pay royalty fees, thereby severely restricting the circulation of such
information.43 Restrictions on making copies of protected material
and the high costs of royalties for reproducing this material—
consequences that result from an increasingly harmonized

36

See Jackson, supra note 26, at 640.
See id. at 643 (describing the consequences of harmonization of copyright
laws).
38
See SUSAN STRBA, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND ACCESS TO
EDUCATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 29 (2012) (explaining the extensive
rights of the copyright holders in developed countries).
39
See id. (noting also that publishers do not often grant licenses to reprint their
books).
40
See id.; see also Annual Meeting of the International Association for the
Advancement of Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property, July 7–9, 1999,
Parallel Imports and International Trade at 1, ATRIP/GVA/99/6 (explaining
that the term “parallel importation” refers to goods produced and sold legally,
and subsequently exported).
41
See STRBA, supra note 38, at 29.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 30.
37
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copyright regime—thus affect the educational goals of developing
countries.44
C. Administrative Costs of Compliance
In addition, harmonization increases the financial burden
on developing nations, as they must bear the administrative cost of
compliance. 45 Developing countries are most often users, not
producers, of copyrighted materials; as a result, they import a
majority of their publications. These imported books are more
expensive than locally reproduced books. 46 Furthermore, the
materials in these works are reprinted or adapted from publishers
in industrialized countries. The administrative costs involved in
obtaining permission from these rights owners, who are mainly
multinational companies from developed countries, are high.47 For
example, in Thailand, between 10% and 60% of the price of a book
can be the result of copyright protection alone.48 This increase in
cost serves as a prohibitive barrier to the general population, where
an average income household may pay up to 6% of its monthly
income for just one textbook. 49 Thus, the harmonization of
international copyright severely curtails the ability of developing
nations to cope with the price of a universal system.
II. The Effects of Harmonization on the International Right to
Free Expression
In Golan v. Holder, the Court scrutinized URAA § 514
under domestic freedom of speech principles. 50 However, the
Court’s decision affects (or extends to) international principles of
freedom of expression.
The international principle of freedom of expression is set
forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.51 Through its
44

Id.
See Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and its Achilles’ Heel, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 479, 488
(2011).
46
See STRBA, supra note 38, at 30–31.
47
See id. at 30.
48
Id. at 31.
49
Id. at 30–31.
50
See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890.
51
See G.A. Res. 217 art. III, U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 19, at 71 (1948) ("Everyone
has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom
45
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appearance in various successive treaties, the principle has become
a fundamental precept of customary international law.52 Entwined
in this principle is the concept that free speech is often best served
by the literal copying of existing expression.53 Effective criticism,
parody, artistic expression, and news reporting often gain
considerable force by their literal reference to existing work.54
Copyright law qualifies the free speech principle that a
speaker is entitled to choose how he communicates an idea, by
proscribing the use of language and other material employed by a
rightsholder. 55 This effectively places a tax on the flow of
information. Therefore, an overly broad set of copyright owner
rights can constrain public access to existing expression and hinder
creative reformulations of that expression, thereby infringing upon
the international right to free expression.56
The international right to free expression encourages
limitations of copyright in order to promote the free flow of
to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers"). The
principle of freedom of expression is also set forth in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). See International Convention on Civil
and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, art. 19(2), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6
I.L.M. 368 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
52
See Neil W. Netanel, The Digital Agenda of the World Intellectual Property
Organization: Comment: The Next Round: The Impact Of The WIPO Copyright
Treaty On TRIPS Dispute Settlement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 441, 476 (1997); see
also Thomas M. Franck, Note, The Emerging Right to Democratic
Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 61–62 (1992) (noting that the overwhelming
support behind the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the prestige
accrued to it in succeeding years has made it a customary rule of state
obligation).
53
See Neil W. Netanel, Asserting Copyright’s Democratic Principles in the
Global Arena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217, 299 (1998).
54
See id. (suggesting that literal copying is often more effective than the mere
reformulation of ideas or information). Copying is also a cheaper method of
conveying ideas or information than the process of creating a whole new work,
see id. Copying expression is thus highly conducive to making information
available to those who might not otherwise afford access, a particular concern in
developing countries, see id.
55
See COPYRIGHT AND FREE SPEECH 24 (Jonathan Griffiths & Uma
Suthersanen, eds., 2005 (discussing how freedom of speech concerns the form of
speech as well as its contents).
56
See Netanel, supra note 52, at 476 (suggesting that while some degree of
copyright protection provides important incentive for the dissemination of
creative expression, an overly maximist reading of the copyright provisions of
TRIPS can hinder that same dissemination).
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information.57 As expanded copyright gradually eliminates these
restrictions, the Golan Court’s embrace of a harmonized
international copyright system will likely have a global effect on
transformative uses of protected works.58
III. Considering the Alternative of Diversification
A universal copyright system can certainly seem appealing:
it promotes efficiency, reduces negotiation costs, and enhances
international stability.59 However, as the costs of harmonization
far outweigh these benefits and the consequences of a universal
international copyright regime suggest that diversification may
provide the better solution.
Diversification of copyright laws would allow countries to
develop protections that are commensurate with their particular
needs and differences, instead of applying a “one size fits all”
solution that creates friction with local conditions.60 Additionally,
as diversification facilitates jurisdictional competition that
safeguards against governmental inefficiency and abuse, and
makes copyright laws more accountable to local populations.61
Tailoring copyright laws appropriately will require research
on nations’ domestic industries and analyses by experts of how
best to maximize a country’s potential. 62 It will require
recognition of the underlying differences between nations. For
countries like India or China, with stronger technological capacity,
the needs will be different than a country in sub-Saharan Africa.63

57

See id.
See Neil W. Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE
L.J. 283, 296 (1996).
59
See Yu, supra note 23, at 382–83.
60
See id. at 383.
61
See id.
62
See COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRATING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 105 (2002)
(U.K.), available at http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/finalreport/
CIPRfullfinal.pdf (stating that the implementation of international copyright
standards in the developing world must be undertaken with a proper
appreciation of their crucial importance for social and economic development);
see also Loew, supra note 32, at 197.
63
See COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRATING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY, supra note 62, at
104 (indicating that different measures may be more or less important in
58
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For those developing countries that have acquired significant
technological and innovative capabilities, a system of weaker
forms of copyright protection is necessary in the formative period
of their economic development.64 This is only possible if these
countries are not forced to comply with an international system
that provides much stronger copyright protection.
CONCLUSION
While many of the limitations and exceptions in copyright
law are explicitly addressed through legislation, the actual
substance and scope of the copyright system is often determined by
courts in the course of adjudication.65 Thus, the Court’s deference
to a harmonized international copyright regime in Golan v. Holder,
and its failure to consider the international costs may have a
broader impact than the Court realized.
The effect of
harmonization on the legal systems of developing nations, and on
international principles of freedom of expression, may ultimately
affect the international copyright regime’s ability to sustain itself
in the long term.

meeting the specific needs in individual countries); see also Loew, supra note
32, at 197.
64
See COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRATING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY, supra note 62, at
1.
65
OKEDIJI, supra note 25, at 20.

